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INTRODUCTION

This Article addresses several significant opinions issued and
legislation passed during the survey period of this publication for the
Georgia civil trial practitioner.'
II.

LEGISLATION

There are a few bills passed during this year's legislative session that
trial practitioners should note. The first is House Bill 190,2 referred to
as the "Uber bill."3 This law imposes minimum liability insurance
requirements on "transportation network compan[ies]"4 and defines
when those liability insurance requirements apply (for example, when
the transportation network company's insurance policy covers a driver
"logged on to the transportation network company's digital network").'
Trial practitioners should also note House Bill 342,6 which abrogates
negligence per se claims against nursing homes while also providing that
trial courts may admit relevant nursing home regulations to establish
the appropriate standard of care and the nursing home's alleged
violations thereof.7 The statute provides, "No violation of any regulations . . . shall constitute negligence per se," but the trial court "in any
civil action shall take judicial notice of these regulations and admit them
into evidence if found to be relevant to the harm alleged in the
complaint."'

1. For an analysis of Georgia trial practice and procedure during the prior survey
period, see Brandon L. Peak et al., TrialPracticeand Procedure,Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 66 MERCER L. REV. 211 (2014).
2. Ga. H.R. Bill 190, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 33-1-24 (Supp. 2015)).
3. See Aaron Gould Sheinin, UberbillsAdvance in State House, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
Mar. 3, 2015, http://www.ajc.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/uber-bills-advance-in-state-house/nkM8g/.
4. O.C.G.A. § 33-1-24(b).
5. O.C.G.A. § 33-1-24(a)(5).
6. Ga. H.R. Bill 342, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 31-7-3.2 (Supp. 2015)).
7. O.C.G.A. § 31-7-3.2(i).
8. Id.
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CASE LAW

Alternative Dispute Resolution
In BDO USA, LLP v. Coe,9 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)"o does not preempt Georgia's procedural
statute for pursuing a motion to compel arbitration." Coe sued BDO
USA, LLP (BDO) in Illinois, alleging various claims against BDO arising
out of tax services BDO provided to Coe. BDO filed a petition in the
Superior Court of Fulton County to compel arbitration pursuant to
arbitration clauses found in the "consulting agreements" between the
parties. 1 2 Coe then moved to dismiss that petition, and the trial court
granted the motion pursuant to section 9-9-6(a) of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.),"' finding that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to consider the petition while the arbitrable issues
were pending before an Illinois court." On appeal, BDO claimed the
trial court erred in dismissing the petition because O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(a)
was preempted by the FAA and the trial court had jurisdiction to
consider the petition under § 4 of the FAA." The court of appeals held
that "our Supreme Court in Jape suggests that the procedural provisions
found in §§ 3 and 4 of the FAA do not apply to state court proceedings"
and "Georgia courts generally apply Georgia law to procedural matters." 6 The court further held that the FAA does not preempt O.C.G.A.
§ 9-9-6(a) "to the extent it controls whether a Georgia court is the
appropriate forum for pursuing a motion to compel arbitration" and that

A.

9. 329 Ga. App. 79, 763 S.E.2d 742 (2014).
10. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 307 (2012).
11. Coe, 329 Ga. App. at 83-84, 763 S.E.2d at 747; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(a) (2007)
("If an issue claimed to be arbitrable is involved in an action pending in a court having
jurisdiction to hear a motion to compel arbitration, the application shall be made by motion
in that action.").
12. Coe, 329 Ga. App. at 79, 79-80, 763 S.E.2d at 744.
13. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(a).
14. Coe, 329 Ga. App. at 79, 763 S.E.2d at 744.
15. Id. at 80, 763 S.E.2d at 744. BDO argued it was unable to file a petition to compel
arbitration in a federal district court in Georgia because there was incomplete diversity
between the parties and an Illinois federal district court was without authority to compel
arbitration outside Illinois. Id. at 81 n.1, 763 S.E.2d at 745 n.1.
16. Id. at 82, 763 S.E.2d at 746 (citing Am. Gen. Fin. Servs. v. Jape, 291 Ga. 637, 641,
732 S.E.2d 746, 749 (2012) and Continental Ins. Co. v. Equity Residential Props. Trust, 255
Ga. App. 445, 445, 565 S.E.2d 603, 603-04 (2002), cert. denied, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 74 (2002)).
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the trial court properly held it was without jurisdiction to consider
BDO's motion to compel under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(a).17
B.

Ante Litem Notice

In Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia v. Myers,18
the Georgia Supreme Court addressed the ante litem notice requirement
in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(5)(E)," which requires the claimant to state
the "amount of the loss claimed to the extent of the claimant's knowledge
and belief and as may be practicable under the circumstances."2 0 The
court held that the plaintiff's ante litem notice was insufficient because
it did not state any amount of loss-such as the medical expenses the
claimant had incurred by the time of the notice. 2 1
In Warnell v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County, the
Georgia Court of Appeals held that the limited waiver of sovereign
immunity under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b), 2 ' based on a county's purchase
of liability insurance, does not bar the county from raising the twelve
month ante litem notice requirement under O.C.G.A. § 36-11-124 as a
defense.2 5
C.

Attorney Fees

In Tolson v. Sistrunk," the court of appeals held that the attorney
lien statute, O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(b), 27 "affords protection to former
counsel who performed legal work for a client in anticipation of filing a
lawsuit, even if successor counsel ultimately filed the suit."28

The

court, however, reversed the trial court's award of twenty-five percent of
the total contingency to the law firm that originated the case concluding,
"Origination or procurement of a case is not a service rendered on behalf
of the client and does not confer any value or benefit upon him or her"
for purposes of the attorneys' lien statute.29

17. Id. at 84, 763 S.E.2d at 747.
18. 295 Ga. 843, 764 S.E.2d 543 (2014).
19. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(5)(E) (2013).
20. Myers, 295 Ga. at 846, 764 S.E.2d at 546 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(5)(E))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
21.

Id.

22. 328 Ga. App. 903, 763 S.E.2d 284 (2014).
23. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) (2013).
24. O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1 (2012).
25. Warnell, 328 Ga. App. at 905, 763 S.E.2d at 287.
26. 332 Ga. App. 324, 772 S.E.2d 416 (2015).
27. O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(b) (2015).
28. Tolson, 332 Ga. App. at 329, 772 S.E.2d at 421.
29. Id. at 332, 772 S.E.2d at 423.
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In McClure v. McCurry," the court of appeals addressed whether a

party waived its right to seek attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14"3
by failing to include its request for fees in the pretrial order.3 2 The
court concluded the statute includes its own procedural requirements,

which only require a party to seek fees "by motion at any time during
the course of the action but not later than 45 days after the final
disposition of the action."3 '

The court determined there was no

authority to support the appellants' position that a party waives its
rights to attorney fees under § 9-15-14 if it does not include such a
34
request in the pretrial order.
In Hal Wright Esq. v. Gentemann," the court of appeals held that a
lawyer may recover fees incurred in suing to collect the fees owed by a
former client as long as the engagement agreement provides a right to
recover attorney fees." The court concluded that if the request for
attorney fees is supported by a contract, "an award of attorney fees is

available with respect to a firm or attorney's self-representation in an
action to collect fees owed by a client."

In LabMD, Inc. v. Savera," the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's conclusion that fees incurred by a party for representation in a
related declaratory judgment action over insurance coverage for the
underlying lawsuit was necessary to the defense of the underlying
lawsuit and recoverable under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14.39
The court,
however, vacated the award of fees and remanded the case for further

proceedings because the trial court did not consider whether the plaintiff
was entitled to a setoff for attorney fees paid by the plaintiff's counsel
40
or for fees paid by the defendant's insurance company.

D.

Class Actions

In Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP v. Ratner,4 1 the Georgia
Supreme Court further defined the "commonality" requirement under

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

329 Ga. App. 342, 765 S.E.2d 30 (2014).
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 (2015).
McClure, 329 Ga. App. at 342, 765 S.E.2d at 30.
Id. at 343, 765 S.E.2d at 31.
Id. at 331, 765 S.E.2d at 31-32.
327 Ga. App. 650, 760 S.E.2d 654 (2014).
Id. at 652, 760 S.E.2d at 656.
Id.
331 Ga. App. 463, 771 S.E.2d 148 (2015).
Id. at 467, 771 S.E.2d at 152.
Id. at 468, 771 S.E.2d at 153.
295 Ga. 524, 762 S.E.2d 419 (2014).
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O.C.G.A. 9-11-23(a) 42 for the certification of a class action.13 The
plaintiffs were property owners who claimed they suffered property
damage as a result of hydrogen sulfide gas emissions from a nearby
sludge field.44 The court determined that meeting the commonality
requirement for class certification means there must not simply be
"common questions" among the plaintiffs-there must also be common
answers.4 1 In other words, those questions must be capable of being
resolved for everyone at once." The plaintiffs did not present evidence
that would establish the entire area, by which the class was defined, was
contaminated by the hydrogen gas from the sludge field and, therefore,
did not meet this requirement." However, the court was careful to
point out that "[n]o one should misunderstand us to say that commonality never can be shown in the context of environmental mass torts, that
it cannot be shown in this case, or even that it cannot be shown in this
case as to the class as the trial court defined it." 8 Thus, Ratner sets
the bar high for establishing commonality in a toxic tort case, but not
insurmountably so.
E.

Dismissal and Renewal
The Georgia Court of Appeals in Gresham v. Harris" declined to
follow the interpretation of Georgia's renewal statute 0 in Morris v.
Haren," a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit.5 2 The court concluded that "an event short of the
termination of the plaintiff's action against the relevant defendant or
defendants cannot constitute a discontinuance under the renewal
statute."" The court also held that "the renewal period does not begin
to run until the case is actually terminated as a result of such action." 4

42. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23(a) (2015).
43. 295 Ga. at 528, 763 S.E.2d at 423.
44. Id. at 524, 762 S.E.2d at 420.
45. Id. at 528, 762 S.E.2d at 423.
46. Id. at 528 n.12, 762 S.E.2d at 423 n.12.
47. Id. at 529, 762 S.E.2d at 423-24.
48. Id. at 531, 762 S.E.2d at 425.
49. 329 Ga. App. 465, 765 S.E.2d 400 (2014), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 74 (2015).
50. O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a) (2007) ("When any case has been commenced in either a state
or federal court within the applicable statute of limitations and the plaintiff discontinues
or dismisses the same, it may be recommenced in a court of this state or in a federal court
either within the original applicable period of limitations or within six months after the
discontinuance or dismissal, whichever is later.
(emphasis added)).
51. 52 F.3d 947 (11th Cir. 1995).
52. Gresham, 329 Ga. App. at 467, 765 S.E.2d 403.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 468, 765 S.E.2d at 403.

2015]

TRIAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

263

In Gottschalk v. Woods," the court of appeals held that "the start of
the six-month window for renewal ...

was triggered by the date the

Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court dismissing
[the plaintiff's] Federal Lawsuit, not the later date when the Eleventh
Circuit's mandate was issued.", 6 The court determined that since the
plaintiff did not "seek and obtain any further review and the case was
not remanded to the district court for further proceedings," the "issuance
of the mandate [was] immaterial . .. because the controversy in federal
court effectively ended when the Eleventh Circuit issued its decision
affirming the district court.""
F

Emergency Room Statute
Georgia's emergency room statute (E.R. Statute)5 8 requires a plaintiff
to show gross negligence by clear and convincing evidence to recover for
injuries "arising out of the provision of emergency medical care."5 In
Hospital Authority of Valdosta v. Brinson,"o the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that when determining whether the E.R. Statute applied,
the critical question is not the patient's actual condition but, rather,
whether the patient "presented [] symptoms that should have alerted the
health care providers that [the patient] required emergency medical
care." 6 1 The court concluded that because the defendants testified the
patient was stable and treated appropriately, and the plaintiff testified
that the patient had some alarming symptoms when he arrived at the
hospital, the question of whether the E.R. Statute applied had to be
resolved by the jury.62
G.

Hospital Liens
In Kight v. MCG Health, Inc.,3 the Georgia Supreme Court addressed the court of appeals decision in MCG Health, Inc. v. Kight,"
holding, inter alia, that the court of appeals did not err when it reversed
the award of partial summary judgment on the ground that "the
[hospital] lien was invalid because there was no debt owing at the time

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

329 Ga. App. 730, 766 S.E.2d 130 (2014).
Id. at 734, 766 S.E.2d at 134.
Id. at 735-36, 766 S.E.2d at 135.
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5 (Supp. 2015).
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c).
330 Ga. App. 212, 767 S.E.2d 811 (2014), reconsiderationdenied (Dec. 5, 2014).
Id. at 220-21, 767 S.E.2d at 817.
Id. at 221, 767 S.E.2d at 817.
296 Ga. 687, 769 S.E.2d 923 (2015).
325 Ga. App. 349, 750 S.E.2d 813 (2013).
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it was filed."" The court determined that "[c]ontrary to the ruling of
the trial court and [the patient's] arguments to this Court, the [h]ospital
was owed money on the date that the lien was filed"-that is, the patient
owed unpaid deductibles and co-pays to the hospital. 66 The court
rejected the patient's argument that the hospital "waived its right to
impose a lien" because the hospital's contract with the patient's
insurance plan "explicitly reserves the [h]ospital's right to collect
deductibles and co-pays directly from [the patient]" and the hospital did
not otherwise agree that it had no recourse against the patient.
The
court also rejected the patient's attempt to rewrite the hospital lien
statute by imposing a requirement that the lien "be exact on the date it
was filed or be considered void ab initio.""
With two sentences, the court diminished the holding in the court of
appeals opinion:
We note that the Court of Appeals opinion, in dicta, discusses wideranging applications of the hospital lien law which simply are not
relevant to the facts of the case currently before this Court. This
opinion affirms the Court of Appeals for the reasons given above, and
we neither reach nor adopt any of the dicta and reasoning except as set
forth herein."
H.

Immunity

In Hartley v. Agnes Scott College,7o the Georgia Supreme Court held
that campus police officers for private colleges do not come within the
definition of a "state officer or employee" in the Georgia Tort Claims Act
(GTCA)n and are, therefore, not entitled to immunity under the
GTCA.7 2
The court of appeals addressed the immunity of the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) in three separate cases. In Department
of T-ansportationv. Kovalcik," there was evidence that the DOT's role
in the underlying events included both approving construction plans for
the redesign of a state road and inspecting the physical property for

65. Kight, 296 Ga. at 687-88, 769 S.E.2d at 924.
66. Id. at 688, 689, 769 S.E.2d at 924, 925 (emphasis omitted).
67. Id. at 689, 769 S.E.2d at 925.
68. Id. at 690, 769 S.E.2d at 925.
69. Id.
70. 295 Ga. 458, 759 S.E.2d 857 (2014).
71. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 to -37 (2013) (defining "state officer or employee" with O.C.G.A.
§ 50-21-22(7)).
72. Hartley, 295 Ga. at 466-67, 759 S.E.2d at 864.
73. 328 Ga. App. 185, 761 S.E.2d 584 (2014).
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compliance with DOT standards as built in accordance with those
plans.74 The court held that under the GTCA, immunity is waived to
the extent the DOT's role included inspection of the state property to
detect hazards or determine compliance with the law, but noted the DOT
is immune under its licensing powers to claims predicated on the DOT's
improper authorization of construction plans."
In Department of ransportation v. Jarvie,16 the court of appeals
"decline[d] to extend the waiver of sovereign immunity to include
independent contractors' conduct even if a State actor in some way
attempts to ensure that contractors are operating safely on a Stateapproved project."" The court held that the DOT was immune from
liability for its decision to allow the stockpiling of aggregate material in
the highway median by an independent contractor." The court
distinguished Kovalcik on the basis that Kovalcik involved the DOT
inspecting a completed roadway project, whereas the DOT's role in
Jarvie was limited to monitoring the method of construction as
previously approved. 9
In a third case, GeorgiaDepartment of ransportationv. Owens,"o the

court of appeals, citing Kovalcik and Jarvie, held that the DOT was
immune to negligence claims based on the DOT's approval of a sitespecific traffic control plan and an on-site inspection of the contractor's
implementation of those plans." However, because there was some
evidence that the DOT exercised responsibility for proposing-rather
than merely approving-modifications to the traffic control plan, the
court held that the DOT was not immune to claims relating to the DOT's
duty to modify the basic traffic control plan.82
I.

Insurance and Direct Actions
In Carter v. Progressive Mountain Insurance," the Georgia Supreme

Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and held that the
manner in which a plaintiff allocates settlement funds pursuant to a
limited liability release does not preclude the plaintiff from seeking
uninsured motorist benefits so long as the defendant's liability coverage
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 189, 761 S.E.2d at 588.
Id. at 189-91, 761 S.E.2d at 588-89; see also O.C.G.A.
329 Ga. App. 681, 766 S.E.2d 94 (2014).
Id. at 684, 766 S.E.2d at 98 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 685, 766 S.E.2d at 98.
Id. at 684 n.14, 766 S.E.2d at 97 n.14.
330 Ga. App. 123, 766 S.E.2d 569 (2014).
Id. at 137-38, 766 S.E.2d at 580-81.
Id. at 136-37, 766 S.E.2d at 580.
295 Ga. 487, 761 S.E.2d 261 (2014).

§ 50-21-24(9) (2013).
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is exhausted. The plaintiff's allocation of settlement funds to punitive
damages and compensatory damages was of no consequence because, in
total, the defendant's liability policy was exhausted." Therefore, the
plaintiff was not precluded from seeking uninsured motorist benefits
from his carrier."
In FCCI Insurance Co. v. McLendon Enterprises, Inc.,8 the Georgia
Supreme Court answered a certified question from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and extended the rationale
applied in Tinsley v. Worldwide Insurance Co., 88 holding that a
tortfeasor's partial immunity from a suit does not preclude an insured
driver from recovering uninsured motorist benefits.89 The insurer
claimed it was not obligated to pay uninsured benefits because its
insured driver was not "legally entitled to recover" anything from the
tortfeasor due to the tortfeasor's partial sovereign immunity from the
suit." The court rejected the insurer's argument since allowing "an
insurer to escape liability under its contract" solely because the
tortfeasor is immune from suit "would be contrary to the purpose of the
[Uninsured Motorist Act]." 9
In Mornay v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, RA., 9 2
93
the court of appeals interpreted O.C.G.A. § 40-1-100(12)(B)(vii), which

84. Id. at 487, 494, 761 S.E.2d at 263, 267.
85. Id. at 488-90, 761 S.E.2d at 263-64. The plaintiff and the defendant executed a
limited liability release with the defendant for $30,000-the defendant's liability insurance
limits. Id. at 488, 761 S.E.2d at 263. In doing so, the plaintiff allocated $29,000 to
punitive damages and $1000 to compensatory damages. Id. The trial court and the court
of appeals erred in finding the plaintiffs allocation of some of the settlement funds to
punitive damages failed to exhaust the limits of the defendant's liability insurance policy.
Id. at 493, 761 S.E.2d at 267.
86. Id. at 489-90, 761 S.E.2d at 264.
87. 297 Ga. 136, 772 S.E.2d 651 (2015).
88. 212 Ga. App. 809, 442 S.E.2d 877 (1994), cert. denied, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 801 (1994).
In Tinsley v. Worldwide Insurance Co., despite the fact that sovereign immunity completely
barred recovery from the tortfeasor, the court of appeals held the plaintiff could recover
from his uninsured motorist carrier. Id. at 811, 442 S.E.2d at 879.
89. FCCIIns. Co., 297 Ga. at 141, 772 S.E.2d at 654.
90. Id. at 138-39, 772 S.E.2d at 653. The insurance policy provided that the insurer
will pay "all sums in excess of the applicable deductible option . . . that the 'insured' is
legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an
'uninsured motor vehicle.'" Id. at 138 n.6, 772 S.E.2d at 653 n.6 (alterations in original).
91. Id. at 141, 772 S.E.2d at 654 (quoting Tinsley, 212 Ga. App. at 810, 442 S.E.2d at
878) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. 331 Ga. App. 112, 769 S.E.2d 807 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 474 (2015).
93. O.C.G.A. § 40-1-100 (2015). The statute provides in relevant part that the term
"motor carrier" shall not include:
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is part of Georgia's Motor Carrier Act" and governs the exclusion of
certain vehicles." Declining to allow the plaintiff to bring a direct
action against the defendant's insurance company, the court held that
the defendant's vehicle was not a "motor carrier" within the meaning of
the statute because the vehicle's actual seating capacity, as opposed to
the vehicle's initially designed seating capacity, was relevant for
determining whether the vehicle was a "motor carrier" applicable to the
Act. 96

Motions for New Trial and Appeals
In Sewell v. Cancel," the Georgia Supreme Court overruled Fulton
v. Pilon,9 holding that where a cross-appeal is timely filed and
procedurally proper, the cross-appeal need not be factually related to the
issues raised in the main appeal." The court also held that an
appellee may raise, in its cross-appeal, adverse rulings that were issued
after the filing of the notice of appeal for the main appeal.oo
In Armstrong v. Gynecology & Obstetrics of Dekalb, R C.,'1 the court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion for new trial after
the plaintiff presented evidence that jurors used their cell phones to look
up words included in the jury instructions. 10 2 The court held that
because there was no testimony regarding the substance of the
definitions found by the jurors and no showing that the information was

J.

(vii) Vehicles, owned or operated by the federal or state government or by any
agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision of the federal or state government,
or privately owned and operated for profit or not for profit, capable of transporting
not more than ten persons for hire when such vehicles are used exclusively to
transport persons who are elderly, disabled, en route to receive medical care or
prescription medication, or returning after receiving medical care or prescription
medication.
Id. § 40-1-100(12)(B)(vii) (emphasis added).
94. O.C.G.A. tit. 46, ch. 7 (2004 & Supp. 2015).
95. Mornay, 331 Ga. App. at 114-16, 769 S.E.2d at 809-11. Note, the vehicle at issue
"was originally designed to seat at least 12 passengers." Id. at 114, 769 S.E.2d at 809. At
the time the plaintiffs claim arose, the vehicle had been retrofitted to transport a
wheelchair and no more than three other passengers. Id.
96. Id. at 116, 769 S.E.2d at 810-11.
97. 295 Ga. 235, 759 S.E.2d 485 (2014).
98. 199 Ga. App. 861, 406 S.E.2d 517 (1991).
99. Sewell, 295 Ga. at 239, 759 S.E.2d at 488.
100. Id. at 239-40, 759 S.E.2d at 488.
101. 327 Ga. App. 737, 761 S.E.2d 133 (2014).
102. Id. at 737-38, 740, 761 S.E.2d at 135, 137.
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prejudicial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new
trial."o'
In Womack v. Johnson,' the court of appeals held the appellants
waived any right to complain about a photograph of the defendant's
infant child that was shown to the jury during opening statements
because the appellants did not object at the time the photo was shown
but, instead, waited until the next day to raise the issue with the trial
court.' The court held that "when a party waits until the conclusion
of the opposing party's argument to object or move for a mistrial, any
error is not preserved for appellate review." 0 6
K.

Sanctions

In North Druid Development, LLC v. Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan,
Inc.,107 the court of appeals held that it is reversible error for a trial
court to dismiss a party's complaint as a sanction by inferring willfulness from the party's failure to respond to discovery requests.10 The
court explained that willfulness may not be inferred; rather, the trial
court must afford the party an opportunity to be heard before dismissal
is imposed as a sanction.'0o In North Druid Development, the plaintiff
failed to respond to the defendant's discovery requests and good faith
letters attempting to resolve the plaintiff's discovery responses. The
defendant filed a motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, to compel
discovery. The plaintiff then produced some responsive documents, but
failed to respond to the defendant's motion. The trial court granted the
motion and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice without
entering an order compelling discovery or affording the plaintiff an
opportunity to be heard. Three years after the entry of final judgment,
the plaintiff attempted to have the dismissal set aside, but the trial
court denied the motion and re-entered its order dismissing the
complaint with prejudice."o The court of appeals held the trial court

103. Id. at 740, 761 S.E.2d at 137.
104. 328 Ga. App. 543, 762 S.E.2d 428 (2014).
105. Id. at 545, 762 S.E.2d at 429-30.
106. Id.
107. 330 Ga. App. 432, 767 S.E.2d 29 (2014), reconsiderationdenied, cert. denied, 2015
Ga. LEXIS 267 (2015).
108. Id. at 438-39, 767 S.E.2d at 34-35.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 433-35, 767 S.E.2d at 31-33. The plaintiff attempted to file its former
attorney's affidavit explaining its failure to respond to discovery requests, but the trial
court struck the affidavit and "explain[ed] that it would not consider the merits of the
sanctions motion, but would instead limit the hearing to the question of whether the order
of dismissal should be set aside on procedural grounds." Id. at 434, 767 S.E.2d at 32.
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erred when it granted the dismissal without first entering an order
compelling discovery and when the plaintiff failed to comply, affording
the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard on the motion for sanctions."'
The court disagreed with the defendant's position that "a court may infer
wilfulness [sic] from a party's failure to respond to discovery requests
without affording the offending party an opportunity to explain its
conduct."" 2 Therefore, the court vacated the dismissal and remanded
the case." 3
Settlement and Offer of Settlement Statute
When the plaintiff seeks punitive damages, the defendant's offer of
settlement under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68n1 must state with particularity
the amount for which he proposes to settle the punitive claim.115 In
Chadwick v. Brazell,"e the Georgia Court of Appeals held that failure
to specifically allocate a portion of the proposed settlement to the
punitive claim prohibits an award of attorney fees under the offer of
L.

settlement statute.1 1 7

In Georgia Department of Corrections v. Couch,' the Georgia
Supreme Court provided guidance on how to calculate attorney fees
when a party is entitled to fees under the offer of settlement statute,
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68.n'
In Couch, the jury's verdict triggered the
application of fees under the statute. The plaintiff had a forty percent
contingency fee agreement with his lawyers. His lawyers submitted
evidence that the value of their services, had those services been billed
at an hourly rate from the time of the offer to the time of settlement,
was over $90,000. The trial court decided that the contingency fee
agreement would set the value of the attorney fee award and awarded
$49,542 in costs.

120

Although the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling, the
Georgia Supreme Court reversed. 12 1 The supreme court reasoned that
the statute only permitted recovery for those fees incurred after the offer

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
(2015).
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 435-36, 767 S.E.2d at 33-34.
Id. at 438, 767 S.E.2d at 34.
Id. at 439, 767 S.E.2d at 35.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 (2015).
See id. § 9-11-68(a)(6); Chadwick v. Brazell, 331 Ga. App. 373, 771 S.E.2d 75
331 Ga. App. 373, 771 S.E.2d 75 (2015).
Id. at 377, 771 S.E.2d at 79.
295 Ga. 469, 759 S.E.2d 804 (2014).
Id. at 483-86, 759 S.E.2d at 815-18.
Id. at 470, 482-83, 759 S.E.2d at 807, 815.
Id. at 486, 759 S.E.2d at 818.
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of settlement was rejected.' 22 Therefore, a trial court could not simply
award the full value of the contingency fees to the defendant without
considering that some of those fees were earned before the offer of
settlement was rejected. 2 3 The court noted that although there was
record evidence of the number and value of hours the plaintiff's counsel
worked after the offer was rejected, the trial court did not appear to
have relied on that evidence.12
Yillman v. Mejabi'` is an important case for any lawyer making or
responding to a demand. In 2111man, the plaintiff made a demand for
the policy limits of a defendant's automobile insurance policy "in full and
final settlement" of the plaintiff's claims without including a proposed
release.126 The insurer accepted the demand by enclosing a check for
the limits and a general release.' 27 The Georgia Court of Appeals held
the settlement was enforceable and the trial court did not err in ordering
the plaintiff to execute a release because the parties had reached "a
meeting of the minds on the essential terms irrespective of [the
insurer's] inclusion of a general release with terms unacceptable to the
[plaintiff's] attorney."1 28
In Patel v. Patel,129 the defendant signed a mediation agreement
without indicating he was signing on behalf of his corporation, of which
he was the sole shareholder and chief executive officer. The agreement
required the defendant to transfer certain properties to the other party.
The court
Those properties, however, belonged to the corporation.'
of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of the motion to enforce the
settlement.' The appellate court reasoned there was a question of
fact regarding whether the defendant had the authority to bind the
corporation because (1) the defendant provided affidavits, which he
stated he signed in his individual capacity and not on behalf of the
corporation, and (2) the record evidence established only that the
defendant was the president of the corporation, not the sole shareholder.1 3 2

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
(2014).
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 485, 759 S.E.2d at 816-17.
Id.
Id. at 484, 759 S.E.2d at 816.
331 Ga. App. 415, 771 S.E.2d 110 (2015).
Id. at 111-12, 771 S.E.2d at 416.
Id. at 112, 771 S.E.2d at 416-17.
Id. at 113, 771 S.E.2d at 418.
327 Ga. App. 733, 761 S.E.2d 129 (2014), cert. denied, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 1005
Id. at 733-34, 761 S.E.2d at 131, 133.
Id. at 734, 761 S.E.2d at 131.
Id. at 735-36, 761 S.E.2d at 132.
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In Tiller v. RJJB Associates, LLP,'3 3 the court of appeals emphasized
the need to state with particularity the claims that an offer of settlement
will resolve."3 ' Two defendants offered to settle "any and all claims
arising out of' the subject incident under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68.'a
However, it was unclear whether the offer included the proposed
settlement of claims against a third defendant, against whom the
plaintiff already had a default judgment.86 In addition, the offer was
not clear regarding its conditions since it required the plaintiff to
dismiss her "Complaint" without stating whether the offer was referring
to the original complaint or her amended complaint, which added the
third defendant.'
M.

Statutes of Limitations

In Gallant v. MacDowell,'"' the Georgia Supreme Court interpreted
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96,1as which governs the tolling of the statute of limitations based on alleged fraudulent concealment by the defendant."o
The court explained that when there is alleged fraudulent concealment
by a doctor, the patient's consultation with a second doctor typically
triggers the end of the tolling of the limitations period under O.C.G.A.
§ 9-3-96 because the patient is no longer deterred from discovering facts
that were allegedly concealed.'"
The court determined the same
rationale does not apply when the patient's consulting doctor provided
to the patient joint medical services with the defendant doctor that is
alleged to have fraudulently concealed facts from the patient. 42 Thus,
the statute of limitations will continue to toll until the patient is no
longer deterred from learning the true facts or consults with a doctor
who is independent of the defendant doctor's services."
In Georgia Regional T-ansportation Authority v. Foster,' the court
of appeals held the tolling provision of O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(d)... does

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

331 Ga. App. 622, 770 S.E.2d 883 (2015).
Id. at 626, 770 S.E.2d at 887.
Id. at 623, 770 S.E.2d at 885.
Id. at 626, 770 S.E.2d at 887.
Id. at 625-26, 770 S.E.2d at 886.
295 Ga. 329, 759 S.E.2d 818 (2014).
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 (2014).
Gallant, 295 Ga. at 332-33, 759 S.E.2d at 821.
Id. at 332, 759 S.E.2d at 821.
Id. at 333, 759 S.E.2d at 821.
Id. at 332-33, 759 S.E.2d at 821.
329 Ga. App. 258, 764 S.E.2d 862 (2014).
O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(d) (2014).
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not apply to claims brought pursuant to the GTCA. 4 6 The court
strictly interpreted a provision in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-27(e),1 4 ' and held
the tolling provision in O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(d)-applicable to claims
against municipalities-was not "intended to apply outside the confines
of its Title, Subpart, and Chapter." 4 8 The court held that applying the
municipal ante litem tolling provision to the State would impose an
obligation on the State that the legislature did not intend.1 4 9
N.

Venue, Removal, and Remand
In Georgia Department of Human Services v. Dougherty County,5 o
the court of appeals held that in a non-tort action against a state governmental agency, where the legislature has not carved out a venue
exception, the place where the defendant resides pursuant to article 6,
section II, paragraph 6 of the Georgia Constitution of 1983151 is the
proper venue.' 5 ' Accordingly, because the principal offices of the
Georgia Department of Human Services and the Division of Child
Support Services are located in Fulton County, the court determined
that Fulton County is the proper venue for a suit against these
governmental entities that seeks to recover statutory service of process
fees.' 5 3
IV.

CONCLUSION

The above cases and legislation have, in the Authors' estimation, most
significantly affected trial practice and procedure in Georgia during the
survey period. This Article, however, is not intended to be exhaustive of
all legal developments for this topic.

146. Ga. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 329 Ga. App at 261, 764 S.E.2d at 865.
147. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-27(e) (2013) ("All provisions relating to the tolling of limitations
of actions, as provided elsewhere in this Code, shall apply to causes of action brought
pursuant to this article.").
148. Ga. Reg'1 Transp. Auth., 329 Ga. App at 260, 764 S.E.2d at 865.
149. Id. at 261, 794 S.E.2d at 865. Unlike municipalities, the court noted the State has
no obligation or deadline to respond to ante litem notices for claims brought pursuant to
the GTCA. Id.
150. 330 Ga. App. 581, 768 S.E.2d 771 (2015).
151. GA. CONST. art VI, § 2, para. 6 (1983).
152. Dougherty Cnty., 330 Ga. App. at 582, 768 S.E.2d at 772.
153. Id. at 582, 768 S.E.2d at 772-73.

